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Arcanum Artis Inveniendi: Leibniz and Analysis
Enrico Pasini
“Mathematics is an experimental 
science. The formulation and testing of 
hypotheses play in mathematics a part 
not other than in chemistry, physics, 
astronomy, or botany” (Wiener 1923, 
271).
I   Introduction
Leibniz was undoubtedly a many-sided man, and a polymathic mind, if ever 
there was one. The concept of analysis is notoriously, for its part, a 
polycephalous monster, and nearly all its meanings are spread through 
Leibniz’s multifarious works, where the philosophical, epistemological, 
logical, and mathematical receptions of the term seem to be inextricably 
interwoven. Much the same is true of its counter-term, synthesis, and thus their 
mutual relation itself presents various aspects.
A thorough survey of these varieties lies far beyond the scope of the 
present study, and they have already supplied the subject-matter of some very 
good accounts (in particular Duchesneau 1993, 55-104). Here we’ll just try to 
find some traces of what Goethe would have called a “red thread”—like the 
one he saw metaphorically twisted throughout the literary cordage of Ottilie’s 
diary in the Wahlverwandtschaften. Analysis is introduced by Leibniz in 
juridical, scientific, mathematical, or philosophical contexts, under different 
conditions and with different purposes; but even for such manifold uses should 
exist some common ground and univocal meaning. The analysis of thoughts 
and that of truths, the analysis of problems and that of things, all imply slightly 
or consistently different proceedings, and nevertheless they must perform 
somehow one and the same operation.
In a very general sense, analysis is for Leibniz, like for anyone else, the 
resolution of something complex into simpler elements. A procedure of this 
kind is applied, for instance, to physical objects by natural scientists. As 
Leibniz writes to des Billettes in 1697, they make use of “a certain analysis of 
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sensible bodies, [protracted only to an extent] useful for the practice of their 
discipline” (Leibniz A, I, 13, 656). Depending on their object, such practices 
can in principle proceed in perfectly symmetrical manners, either from 
individual entities to universal features, or from universal concepts to 
particular instances. Thus Martial Gueroult distinguished two aspects of 
analysis with respect to Leibniz, one that “goes from the concrete to the 
abstract; this is the one which tends to ascend indefinitely towards the simple 
notions”; and another one “which, on the contrary, goes from the abstract to 
the concrete and, in principle, from the less to the more real” (Gueroult 1946, 
251). There are Leibnitian texts on the analysis of physical bodies confirming 
this interpretation1, but it is anyway somewhat too vague to be useful outside 
the immediate terrain of application.
II   Truth conditions
A first preciser specification of analysis, and a distinguishing one as for 
Leibniz’s thought, is its application to truths, that is, as it may also be called, 
“conceptual” analysis: 
“According to Leibniz, truths of reason in general, and logical truths in particular, 
are necessary and eternal, true in all possible worlds, provable (i.e. reducible to 
identical propositions) in a finite number of steps, and hence ’analytic‘ in the strong 
sense (namely, the conceptual analysis that shows that the concept of the predicate 
is contained in that of the subject can be actually performed)” (Dascal 1988, 27).
Here a “truth” is the description of a state of fact expressed by one or 
several propositions in the form “subject-predicate” (substance-state), i.e. each 
proposition specifying a property of a determined substance at a determined 
instant of time—a property as such or a property acting as a non-relational 
“requisitum” to a relational state of things (Mugnai 1992). Leibniz writes in 
the §33 of the Monadology: 
“When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into 
more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primitive” (Leibniz 
GP, VI, 612). 
In every propositional truth, the predicate is someway contained in the 
subject, connected by conditions that can be showed by analysis—just like 
mathematical theorems, adds Leibniz notably, “are reduced by analysis to 
Definitions, Axioms and Postulates” (ibid.). 
So there must also be a reason, or a chain of reasons, for all truths of fact, 
that is to say, for contingent truths. They concern the sequences of events that 
constitute the universe of created beings, in which “the analysis into particular 
reasons might go on into endless detail” (ibid., 613), because of the immense 
variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. 
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“There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which join to make up 
the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute 
tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which contribute to make its final 
cause” (ibid.). 
And all this minuteness involves infinite other contingent objects and 
events, “each of which still requires a similar analysis” (ibid.). As Leibniz once 
briefly condensed his theory of contingency, the root of contingency lies in the 
infinite (radix contingentiae est in infinitum): truths of fact are contingent, 
because no analysis can exhaust the infinite complexity of their truth 
conditions. 
We are confronted here with the most general sense of the term, in which 
the concept of analysis is restricted to its fundamental elements. In so far as 
this is meant, it is true what Rescher maintains: that for Leibniz “‘analysis’ is a 
logical process of a very rudimentary sort, based on the inferential procedures 
of definitional replacement and determination of predicamental containment 
through explicit use of logical process of inference” (Rescher 1967, 23). But 
it’s easy to find quite different epistemological conceptions of analysis in 
Leibniz’s writings, in particular when questions concerning the scientific 
method are dealt with.
III   There is Method in't
Leibniz felt a lively interest in the advancement of medical knowledge and of 
its methods. In a De scribendis novis medicinae elementis, written in 1680-82, 
we find the following remarks on the difference between analysis and 
synthesis in the study of pathology: 
“The method is truly analytical when, for every function, we investigate its media, 
or organs, and their modes of operating; thus we acquire knowledge of the body 
from [the knowledge of] its parts. After having completed this, we’ll return to the 
synthesis, coordinating everything to the one, and we’ll describe the prime motor, 
the instruments of motion (both the liquid and the solid ones), their connections, 
and the whole economy of the animal” (in Pasini 1996, 214). 
The synthesis is then drawn from theoretical principles, namely the Galenic 
distinction of vessels, humours and spirits, out of which Leibniz’s favourite 
definition of the animal body as an “hydraulo-pneumatical-pyrobolical engine” 
can easily be deduced.
Synthesis is here an a priori proceeding, while analysis is a method to 
acquire empirical knowledge. Both contribute to the investigation of 
physiology, but analysis seems to act as first, being the chief mean to 
systematically gather information, whereas synthesis represents the correct 
foundation by which it is possible to gain systematicity for the information 
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collected. This conception, of course, is not in any way peculiar of Leibniz2.
If we read further in the De scribendis novis medicinae elementis, towards 
the end we encounter again the opposition of analysis and synthesis; this time 
the matter is not the method of investigation, but the communication of 
knowledge. Both analysis and synthesis again play a defined role: this is quite 
relevant, since the idea that analysis pertains mainly to discovery and synthesis 
to explaining and teaching is at Leibniz’s time very close to a commonplace.
“Duplex Methodus tractandi Morbos”, he declares, “una Analytica per 
symptomata, altera Synthetica per causas” (ibid., 217). Disease can be 
considered analytically, based upon symptoms, or synthetically, based upon 
causes. It is important to teach first the true analysis of illness, writes Leibniz 
further, namely “the art both to inquire into the signs, and to identify an illness 
by means of signs” (ibid.). Synthesis will be taught only after giving a 
specimen of analysis, i.e. “a general healing method, which is to the 
pathological synthesis what algebra is to the elements of geometry” (ibid.). 
Here again we see Leibniz draw a parallel with mathematics, and in particular 
between the method of analysis in general, and algebra—that is, for a 
mathematician of his time, analysis in the most proper sense.
IV   The Anatomy of Wit
Leibniz maintains, more in general, that inventive people who make 
discoveries and enlarge knowledge usually proceed in two ways: “per 
Synthesin sive Combinationem et per analysin” (Leibniz VE, 1362), as we 
read in a De arte characteristica et inventoria. Combination, or synthesis, is a 
conjunction of  thoughts, maybe even arbitrary, so devised as to let some new 
knowledge arise. Analysis requires to dwell upon the proposed subject, and to 
resolve its concept into other simpler concepts, or to determinate its requisite 
elements or components.
Leibniz observes that all inventive spirits are either more combinatory or 
more analytical in disposition. A combinatory wit can remind of things past 
and connect them to present needs and experiences. Analytics thoroughly 
examine present things, but remain so immersed in their object as to limit their 
power of observation. Combinatory spirits are superior, because their ability is 
a rare gift: “Combinare vero remota promte, non est cujusvis” (ibid., 1363).
In the second version of a programmatic sketch De arte combinatoria 
scribenda, Leibniz remarks analogously: 
“I must premise a chapter concerning the difference between the analytical and the 
combinatory method, and the difference between analytical and combinatory 
wits” (Leibniz VE, 1098). 
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Analytical wits, according to him, are more short-sighted, so to speak, 
while combinatory ones are rather long-sighted (“Analytici magis Myopes; 
Combinatorii magis similes presbites”, ibid., 1099): in fact, in analysis it is 
suitable to pay attention to fewer things, but with more precision, whereas 
combinatorics considers many things together, and much more perspectively; 
thus analysis has more in common with miniature painting, and combinatorics 
with large-scale sculpture.
Analysis is much easier to apply, since it consists of definable procedures: 
“Once a procedure of analysis is detected, it requires only attention, or firmness of 
mind (...) and indeed there are such people, whose wit isn’t vagabond, and who are 
able to reckon in their imagination, even without paper and pencil” (ibid.). 
Combinatorics, on the contrary, requires to quickly and promptly browse a 
manifold of subjects, and to treat them in unexpected ways. Their practical 
instruments also differ: people with a weaker imagination make use of figures 
and symbols to better focus questions, while those with a weaker memory and 
unable to represent many things together, are helped by the use of tables. 
“Characteristica vera et tabulis et analysi auxiliatur” (ibid.). 
In the art of discovery, that is in the course of knowledge, both analytic and 
combinatory spirits, as we read in the De arte characteristica et inventoria, 
will particularly profit of a method. The method is described in general: 
“Methodus inveniendi consistit in quodam cogitandi filo id est regula 
transeundi de cogitatione in cogitationem” (ibid.). Method means something 
that provides the thinking processes with a leading thread, i.e. with a rule 
regulating the movement from one thought to the other. The rule must consist 
in a palpable instrument: as the compass rules the hand in correctly tracing a 
circle, for correct thinking “instrumentis quibusdam sensibilibus 
indigemus” (ibid.). These palpable instruments of thought are again tables for 
the combinatorics and characters—symbols—for the analysis3.
“Characterem voco quicquid rem aliam cogitanti repraesentat” (ibid.)—a 
character is anythings that represents another thing to a thinking person. If we 
could keep the things themselves before us, we would have less need for such 
characters. The representation is based on some relation or rule of 
correspondence between them: so the ellipse represents a circle by being its 
projection. Models and figures of things can be considered as characters: they 
too are crafted so as to express the essence of the thing. Characters don’t need 
to be similar to the objects they represent: numerical symbols express correctly 
the properties of number, but they don’t resemble them.
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V   Thought instruments
This conception of the method as an instrument, or a collection of instruments 
and techniques, and not as a set of precepts, marks one of the most important 
differences between Leibniz and the greater part of his contemporaries, 
notably Descartes. For Leibniz a method “is” an instrument, and an 
instrument, in the method of analysis, is an algorithm based on characters. 
Hence, on non-mathematical ground too, analysis is in principle a symbolic 
operation for Leibniz. Moreover, systems of symbolic operations, i.e. 
algorithms, can be legitimately used, both for the comprehension and 
organization of existing knowledge and for the creation of new knowledge, 
also outside their traditional grounds.
The construction of general methods for the acquisition, sharing and 
transmission of knowledge, in the form of complex algorithmic instruments for 
logical and conceptual calculi, is an idea that dates back to the young Leibniz. 
Adolescent, he devised an “alphabet of human thoughts”: it will grow into one 
of Leibniz’s greatest projects, that of an art of discovery based on a 
“characteristic” (art of characters or symbols) of general use for combinatorics 
and analysis at the same time. 
An analysis of our thoughts (analyse de nos pensées), states Leibniz in 
1684, is “of the greatest importance both for judging and for 
inventing” (Leibniz A, I, 4, 342). This analysis of thought, he specifies 
elsewhere, “respondet analysi characterum”, corresponds to a symbolic 
analysis, in that characters can express our thoughts and their relations, thus 
providing our reasonings with a “mechanical thread” (Leibniz VE, 811) This 
idea is explained more clearly in many programmatic essays, one of which 
received the not particularly original title of Initia et specimina scientiae novae 
generalis (“First steps and examples of a new general science”). Leibniz 
distinguishes between dialectics, or analysis of opinions, and analysis of 
truths; the latter, he affirms, is the secret for the development of the art of 
invention and discovery:
“I shall also add the vulgar analysis of human judgements, i.e. the principles on 
which human opinions are based, that are dialectic and ought not to be despised. It 
wouldn’t be necessary to bring them into surer principles, only with the purpose to 
confirm something we already know. But since the whole secret of the art of 
discovery [totum arcanum artis inveniendi], by virtue of which human science 
could make an immense progress, depends on the analysis of truths (that is the 
emendation of our thoughts), it is convenient to proceed to the highest levels of 
analysis” (Leibniz VE, 702).
This art will comprehend a method to perform in any field rigorous 
demonstrations, “equal or even superior to mathematical ones, which suppose 
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many elements that here could be demonstrated” (ibid.). It is a wholly new 
calculus, that, according to Leibniz, is at work in every human reasoning and 
is nevertheless as accurate as arithmetical or algebraic calculations are. 
The same concepts are repeated ever and again in Leibniz’s countless 
manifestoes for this new discipline:
“Since when I had the pleasure to considerably improve the art of discovery, or 
analysis, of the mathematicians, I began to have certain new views, that is, to 
reduce all human reasoning to a sort of calculus, which would be of use in 
discovering a truth in so far as it is possible ex datis, i.e. from what is given or 
known” (Leibniz GP, VII, 25). 
A universal writing would also result of it, that “would be like a sort of 
general algebra, and would give the means to perform reasoning by 
calculation” (ibid., 26): such a calculus would not only be an instrument for 
learning and research, but it would be an infallible judge of controversies as 
well, offering a way to solve disputes by simple reckoning. 
Leibniz explains this extended meaning of calculus in a letter he wrote to 
Tschirnhaus in 1678: “Nihil enim aliud est Calculus, quam operatio per 
characteres, quae non solum in quantitate, sed et in omni alia ratiocinatione 
locum habet” (Leibniz GM, IV, 462). A calculus is nothing else than an 
operation performed by means of characters—that is, an algorithm of symbolic 
analysis—that takes place not only with quantities, but in any kind of 
reasoning as well. 
VI   The place of analysis 
The place of analysis in this more general frame is, as one may expect, quite 
variable. In a short and schematic note, Leibniz lists the chapters for a work to 
be entitled Guilielmi Pacidii Plus Ultra sive Initia et specimina scientiae 
generalis. There we find among others the following arrangement of analysis 
and synthesis, combinatory and discovery, mathesis and art of invention:
“10. De arte inveniendi
11. De synthesi seu arte combinatoria
12. De Analysi
13. De combinatoria speciali, seu scientia formarum, sive qualitatum in genere sive 
de simili et dissimili
14. De Analysi speciali seu scientia quantitatum in genere seu de magno et parvo
15. De mathesi generali ex duabus praecedentibus composita” (Leibniz GP, VII, 
49-50)
Analysis and combinatorics in general seem to be tied to the art of 
invention; two more specific versions, that concern quantity and forms, are 
presented as the two branches that compose universal mathesis4. 
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Another more detailed program is rubricated Initia et specimina scientiae 
generalis. It describes at length the structure of a complex work, dedicated to 
the “instauratione et augmentis scientiarum” (Leibniz GP VII, 57). After a first 
book dedicated to the logical form of arguments and to the ways to determine 
the eternal truths, the second book should treat de arte inveniendi, the “art of 
discovery, namely that of the tangible thread by which investigation is ruled”, 
and of its divisions, “ejusque artis speciebus”, namely combinatorics and 
analysis (ibid.).
In the Fundamenta calculi ratiocinatoris (1688-1689) Leibniz defines the 
calculus used in the universal art of characters as follows: “A calculus or 
operation consists in the exhibition of relations, performed by the 
transmutation of formulas according to some prescribed rule” (Leibniz VE, 
1205); again, it might well be an exemplar definition of the analytical 
proceedings. And anyway, for Leibniz, any analytical calculation is a formal 
argument: as we read in a latter to the palatine countess Elisabeth of 1678: 
“un calcul d’analyse est un argument in forma, puisqu’il n’y a rien qui y manque, et 
puisque la forme ou la disposition de tout ce raisonnement est cause de 
l’evidence” (Leibniz A, II, 1, 437).
When Leibniz defines combinatorics in his De artis combinatoriae usu in 
scientia generali (of 1683-84), he states that “Combinatoria agit de calculo in 
universum”, the combinatory art deals with every aspect of the calculus, 
“that is to say, with universal marks or characters (...) and their rules, dispositions 
and processes, or with formulas universally. Of this general calculus, the algebraic 
calculus is a species, i.e. the one based on the laws of multiplication” (Leibniz VE, 
1354). 
If even combinatorics reveals blatantly to be framed just like analysis, on 
the other hand mathematical analysis is clearly, as Leibniz himself often 
affirms, a specimen of the ars characteristica. In 1691 Leibniz writes to 
Huygens that: 
“the best and most convenient feature in my new calculus is this: that it exhibit 
truths by means of a sort of analysis, without any of those efforts of the 
imagination, that often succeed only by chance, and thus gives us the same 
advantage over Archimedes that Vieta and Descartes let us gain over 
Apollonius” (Leibniz GM, II, 104). 
The infinitesimal calculus, he means, frees the geometer from the need to 
concentrate on the geometrical situation of the problem in order to devise a 
helpful construction, such as the insertion of a suitable ad-hoc linear segment.
Three months later Leibniz hammers again the qualities of his calculus in 
Huygens’ mind, and he supports his argument with an example: 
“I remember that, as I once studied the cycloid, my calculus presented to me the 
greater part of the discoveries that have been made on the subject, nearly without 
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any need for meditation. Indeed what I like best in this calculus, is that it gives us 
the same advantage in the field of Archimedean geometry that Vieta and Descartes 
have given us in Euclidean and Apollonian geometry, since it exempts us from 
working with the imagination” (ibid., 123). 
In fact, from the study of the function it is possible to exhibit numerous 
geometrical properties of the curve, by way of analysis: “Caeteraque omnia 
circa cycloidem inventa, pluraque alia similiter ex tali calculo analytice 
derivantur.» (Leibniz GM, II, 118)
VII   Calculus on my mind
Leibniz often intends with “analysis” a particular analytical method or a set of 
analytical techniques, developed by other mathematicians, and from some 
writings of his one might imagine that “quot sunt capita, tot sunt analyses”. 
Leibniz is clearly conscious of the novelty and peculiarity of his mathematical 
discoveries. He writes in 1692: 
“I have developed a new analysis concerning the infinite; it is quite different from 
Cavalieri’s geometry of indivisibles and from Wallis’ arithmetic of infinite series, 
since it doesn’t depend on lines as the former, nor on numerical series, as the latter, 
but it is general, and thus symbolic or Specious. But instead of the vulgar analytical 
calculus applying to powers and roots, it performs the calculus of differences and 
summations” (Leibniz GM, V, 263-264).
“Vulgar” analysis (i.e. the algebra of Descartes, his mathematical and 
philosophical tête de turque) is often reprehended by Leibniz, since it doesn’t 
comprehend some of the most fascinating concepts of seventeenth century 
mathematics (infinitesimals, imaginary numbers), nor some of the most 
important objects of Leibniz’s analytic research (transcendent relations, the 
theory of determinants).
A very important methodological distinction is drawn in a famous letter 
addressed to Antonio Magliabecchi. There are two forms of analysis, states 
Leibniz here; first comes the analysis of Vieta and Descartes, that is considered 
by the moderns to be the only analysis, and “that solves every problem 
separately, studying the relation of the unknown to the known 
quantities” (Leibniz GM, VII, 312). The other one has its scope in reducing the 
problem “to another problem, easier than the first one” (ibid.). The latter was 
known also to the ancients, as it appears, for instance, from the Data. In 
writing to Huygens, Leibniz explains this distinction as that between analysis 
“per saltum” and “per gradus, cum problema propositum reducimus ad aliud 
facilius” (Leibniz GM, II, 116-117). The first one is more absolute, but the 
second often works better. 
In a De methodis synthetica et anagogica applicandis in algebra, the 
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synthetic method is defined analogously: “cum problema difficile soluturi 
incipimus a facilioribus” (Leibniz VE, 1095). Leibniz also observes that 
algebra performs a fake synthesis, in treating the unknown quantities as if they 
were known. The anagogic method is that of pure analysis, “quae nihil 
syntheseos habet” (ibid.); and the “Data veterum” are of pertinence to the 
anagogic method, that hence appears to be the heir of the method described to 
Magliabecchi. Here we proceed backwards, “always reducing the problem to 
another, easier problem. And this is my method” (ibid.), adds Leibniz, used for 
ordinary equations, but also for the resolution of the ordinates of a curve, viz. 
in transcendent problems. 
Another front is to be opened soon. As Leibniz writes to Mélchisedec 
Thévenot in 1691: 
“Since I believe that geometry and mechanics have now become fully analytical, I 
have devised to extend the calculus to other subjects, even to subjects that until now 
nobody thought would have supported it” (Leibniz A, I, 7, 356). 
And he adds, as usual: “Here I mean by ’calculus‘ every notation 
representing a reasoning, even without any relationship to numbers” (ibid.). 
In 1679, four years after the completion of his work on the fundamentals of 
the infinitesimal calculus, Leibniz writes to Huygens: “Mais apres tous les 
progres que j’ay faits en ces matieres, je ne suis pas encor content de 
l’algebre” (Leibniz GM, II, 18-19), after all the work I did with algebra I think 
we need something different and more powerful in treating with geometrical 
entities. It is “une autre analyse proprement geometrique ou lineaire, qui nous 
exprime directement situm” (ibid., 19): an analysis specific to loci, i.e. an 
analytic topology. Algebra represents quantities with appropriate symbols and 
operations: other symbols and operations can calculate forms, angles, 
orientations, movements, in their qualitative aspects too.
The most important use of this analysis, anyway, is to help in geometrical 
reasoning: “on trouve ainsi par une espece de calcul”, the same words used to 
describe the advantages of infinitesimal analysis, “tous ce que la geometrie 
enseigne jusqu'aux elemens d'une maniere analytique et determinée” (ibid., 
26). By this calculus it is possible to determine analytically everything that 
belongs to geometry, up to its most fundamental elements. 
As an obvious example of immaterial cognitive technology, this new 
analysis situs is, of course, an art of characters, and an art of invention: “Cette 
caracteristique”, adds Leibniz, will even express in symbols all mechanical 
structures and will help us to find new geometrical constructions, “à trouver de 
belles constructions”, since it contains at one time both the procedures of 
calculus and of construction” (GM 2, 30-31).
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VIII   An engine for your thoughts
“Quod omnium maxime quaero est Machina, quae pro nobis faciat operationes 
analyticas, quemadmodum Arithmetica a me reperta facit numericas” (Leibniz 
A, VI, 3, 412). What I most desire, Leibniz writes already in 1674, is a 
machine that performs analytical operations, just as the calculating machine he 
invented carries out the arithmetic ones. This idea of an analytical engine is 
hindered, one may say, by the inadequacy of its programming language, since 
“the universal analysis depends on the development of a universal 
character” (Leibniz A, VI, 3, 413). Meanwhile, for the use of complex 
reasonings, it is acceptable to surrogate the required special-purpose characters 
with generic characters, such as the letters used in geometry5. But in general 
the signs we presently use to compose analytical formulas, adds Leibniz, can’t 
suitably express the mental operations involved in their treatment, by means of 
simple analytical procedures as transpositions or linear transformations. 
Anyway, it is not an impossible task, since “omnes cogitationes non sunt nisi 
simplices complicationes idearum” (ibid.): thoughts derive in the ultimate 
analysis from simple components, simply combined, as words are composed 
by simple letters, and the complex apparatus of thoughts needs only to be 
brought back to such simplicity. 
But in reality our thoughts aren’t so transparent: even if we were able to 
perform thorough analyses of the concepts we use, we would not ipso facto be 
aware of its results at any moment of our thinking processes: “when  a notion 
is very composite, we can’t think of all its ingredients together, as with an 
intuitive notion” (Leibniz GM, IV, 610). Leibniz discusses such issues in his 
Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, a short essay published in 1684 
and dealing mainly with the classification of ideas into clear, distinct, obscure, 
adequate etc. We have a distinct notion of something, Leibniz affirms, if our 
knowledge contains enough marks to discern it from all similar objects. But 
“in most cases, in particular when a very complex Analysis is required, we 
can’t represent intuitively the whole nature of the object, and we use signs 
instead” (ibid.). 
This sort of reasoning, says Leibniz, can be called “blind reasoning, or also 
symbolic reasoning, as we make use of in Algebra and Arithmetic, and indeed 
in every moment” (ibid.). Symbols like those of analysis, are the true 
instruments of thought: in particular, they are for human thought a sort of 
indispensable blind-flying instruments—under conditions where normal 
thought is “blind-thought”. “Et huius generis cogitationes”, in Leibniz’s 
words, “soleo vocare caecas, quibus nihil apud homines frequentius aut 
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necessarium magis” (Leibniz A, VI, 2, 481). This is the most intimate kernel 
and the real operational mode of human thought: that it operates mostly by 
means of symbols, that is to say it operates in the same way as algebraic 
algorithms, or analytical algorithms do—those of the “literal” or “specious” 
analysis. That’s why this last one is so successful, and useful, and sure, in 
matters so difficult and general as reasoning and problem solving: “Hinc 
Symbolica illa recentiorum analysis (...) tanti est ad celeriter et secure 
ratiocinandum usus” (ibid.). 
The cogitatio caeca or symbolica finally is, according to Leibniz, in itself 
the best human instrument for problem solving, that is to say for the 
augmentation of “both knowledge, and happyness” (ibid.)—and mathematical 
analysis mirrors it. Not bad, in the end.
Endnotes
1 In the De modo perveniendi as veram corporum analysin of 1677: “Duplex est 
resolutio: una corporum in varias qualitates per phenomena seu experimenta, altera, 
qualitatem sensibilium in causas sive rationes per ratiocinationem” (Leibniz GP, VII, 
268). If we combine such analyses with experiments, adds Leibniz, we’ll easily 
determine the causes of any quality found in any physical subject.
2 For instance, a quite conformable statement can be read in Newton’s Optics: “The 
Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover’d, and establish’d as Principles, and 
by them explaining the Phænomena proceeding from them” (Newton 1721, 380).
3 It must be observed that the instruments intended for the combinatory are mostly 
traditional, static and trite; the instruments for analysis powerfully embody innovation.
4 And in the Elementa nova matheseos universalis (written between 1684 and 1687): 
“Tradetur et Synthesis et Analysis, sive tam Combinatoria, quam Algebra.” (Leibniz 
VE, 987).
5 In this way, if the specific knowledge that enters in a logical calculation is already set 
up, it will be easier to coordinate this particular specimen of the art to the general frame 
of the universal characteristic.
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